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Abstract
Equalization transfers are a common and noteworthy feature of fiscal
decentralization systems around the world, especially in developing countries.
However, the way in which they are designed and implemented is not clearly rooted
in mainstream public finance theory. In this paper we develop a formal framework
to explain the rationale of the fiscal gap model (the difference between expenditure
needs and fiscal capacity of a jurisdiction), arguably the most popular model used
by applied economists for the design of equalization transfer programs. First we
take into account the problem of accountability. If government authorities are selfinterested, transfers from upper levels are shown to reduce their responsiveness to
taxpayers’ preferences. Next, we use a normative approach to derive the
conventional fiscal gap formula. We argue that equalization transfers should only
be used to finance limited types and amounts of public expenditures, called here
standard public expenditures. In contrast, discretional public expenditures (not
subject to equalization) should be financed exclusively with own revenues. Last,
we describe the conditions that ensure the affordability of the system. We conclude
that the fiscal gap model of equalization is sufficient to efficiently allocate the
available funds across jurisdictions, setting the marginal cost of funds at the
appropriate level. However, no information on the marginal cost of funds is
required. Policymakers can simply rely on estimates of expenditure needs and fiscal
capacity to design an optimal equalization transfer program.
Keywords: fiscal federalism, equalization transfers, optimal taxation,
marginal cost of funds, public expenditures
JEL classification: H21, H40, H71
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1. Introduction
The design of an optimal equalization transfer program has been the focus of an extensive
research in the literature of fiscal federalism. The model of fiscal gaps, which allocates
equalization transfers in accordance to the differences between expenditure needs and fiscal
capacities, is arguably the dominant model used by applied economists in fiscal decentralization
reforms around the world. This model has been championed by international organizations like the
World Bank, the United Nations, and bilateral donors in many developing countries over the past
several decades (Boadway and Shah 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Searle 2007). However, in spite
of its widespread use, the design of equalization transfers based on the fiscal gap model has not
been directly rooted in mainstream public finance theory, and applied economists routinely
struggle to establish its theoretical underpinnings.
The objective of this paper is to provide a theoretical rationale for the fiscal gap model.
Even though the literature has long recognized the importance of effective tax and expenditure
autonomy to foster efficiency and ensure the presence of accountability mechanisms (Bird and
Smart 2002; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2006), and equalization transfers have already been
analyzed in the framework of optimal tax theory (Dahlby and Wilson 1994; Boadway and Keen
1996; Bucovetsky and Smart 2006; Dahlby 2009), to date it is not clear if and how the fiscal gap
model can be used to implement an optimal equalization transfer program.1 We show that the
fiscal gap model is compatible with the notion of an optimal equalization transfer program and
explain what applied economists and policymakers should consider in order to implement such
program.

1

For a wide discussion of equalization transfers and the fiscal gap model, see Martinez-Vazquez and Searle (2007).
Note that we use the term “subnational” to refer to any government unit below the central or “national” level. The
analysis in the paper is applicable to any subnational level.
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The framework presented in this paper is divided in three stages, intended to integrate the
main normative goals and practical constraints faced by policymakers in the design and
implementation of an equalization grant based on the fiscal gap model. The first stage deals with
the role of equalization transfers in the broader context of the revenue assignment problem and the
need to limit their amount due to possible negative effects on accountability and government
responsiveness. Fiscal decentralization experts have long claimed that taxpayers hold authorities
accountable only (or mostly) when public expenditures are financed with own tax revenue;
consequently, transfers are expected to reduce accountability, government responsiveness, and tax
effort (Faguet 2004; Blöchliger and Charbit 2008; Liu and Zhao 2011). We provide theoretical
support for this claim, and argue that the devolution of substantial own revenue sources is a
precondition for a well-functioning equalization transfer program. An incentive-compatible
equalization transfer program must penalize inefficient decisions without hindering subnational
fiscal autonomy.
The second stage focuses on the design of an optimal equalization transfer program. As it is
explicitly or implicitly done in most federal and decentralized countries, we assume that the goal
of the equalization transfer program is to ensure that all subnational governments are able to
provide a standard level of public goods and services at a standard level of tax effort. We argue
that the optimal transfer system should be computed under the assumption of perfect government
responsiveness, and with the use of a standard tax rate and a standard administrative cost function.
In this framework, irresponsive and inefficient governments are penalized with lower equalization
transfers. We distinguish standard public expenditures, which should be subject to equalization,
from discretional public expenditures, which should not be subject to equalization. Once
equalization transfers have been assigned, subnational governments should enjoy “autonomy at the
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margin,”2 interpreted here as the discretional use of tax policy to finance autonomous or
discretional (non-standard) public expenditures. Finally, in the third stage we obtain the optimal
conditions that ensure the affordability of the equalization transfer program.
A relevant concern is the practical relevance of some policy prescriptions for equalization
transfer design derived from the framework of optimal tax theory. In particular, it is not realistic to
expect that central government authorities and politicians will be able to equalize the marginal cost
of public funds across jurisdictions. In practice, this is an abstract concept that is normally absent
from policy debates. In this paper, we show that in fact policy makers do not need to observe the
marginal cost of funds to implement the optimal revenue assignment policy. Instead, the fiscal gap
model is sufficient to design an equalization transfer program that tacitly sets the marginal cost of
funds at the appropriate level. In practice, policy makers can focus only on defining what
subnational services are to be considered as part of the national standards and the size of the
equalization transfer fund.
The remains of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the first stage of the
model, focused on the problem of limited government responsiveness in a context where
authorities are self-interested and accountability is imperfect. Section 3 presents the second stage
of the model, focused on the normative problem of designing the optimal amount of equalization
transfers, and showing how the fiscal gap model is sufficient to implement this program. Section 4
presents the optimal conditions for the system that implements the equalization transfer program to
be affordable. Section 5 concludes.

This rule was first put forward by McLure (2000), and its rationale is closely related to Oates’ (1972)
Decentralization Theorem, according to which, whenever centralized expenditure policies are common across
jurisdictions and preferences are heterogeneous, social welfare can be increased by decentralized autonomous
decision-making. Effective autonomy in the expenditure side of the budget, however, requires autonomy to change the
amount of revenues; thus, the ability to efficiently satisfy local preferences calls for both expenditure and revenue
autonomy at the margin.
2

3

2. Accountability and the effect of transfers on government responsiveness
All intergovernmental transfers have the potential of introducing perverse incentives in the
decentralization system by reducing accountability and public responsiveness, and even tax effort.
In this section, we examine what conditions should an equalization transfer program satisfy so to
avoid those undesirable effects.
Accountability can be understood as the ability of individuals to use political support (or
lack thereof) to improve the fiscal decisions of government authorities, who may be concerned not
only about social welfare but also (or instead) about their own selfish benefits. In this context,
more accountability leads to a more responsive government, and thus to a better match of fiscal
decisions with individuals’ needs and wants. Accountability has been mostly addressed in the
political economy literature, which has focused on the different factors that may affect
accountability and the degree of preference matching in centralized versus decentralized systems
of government (Lockwood 2005; Bardhan 2002; Besley and Coate 2003). This literature suggests
that accountability increases with revenues that are collected inside the jurisdiction, or
equivalently, it decreases with windfalls and transfers from outside the jurisdiction.
However, this claim has only recently begun to be empirically tested. Brollo et al. (2013)
develop a political agency model and show that an increase in transfers, as opposed to own
revenues, is associated with greater corruption. Using village-level data from an Indonesian
district, Paler (2013) shows that own taxation provides stronger incentives than windfall transfers
to monitor the budget and constrain the government. Similarly, Gadenne (2017) finds that
increases in local taxes in Brazilian municipalities have positive effects on the quality of local
public infrastructure, while equal increases in intergovernmental transfers do not.
4

Even though this previous literature is suggestive of the type of problems that can arise
with accountability in the design of a system of intergovernmental transfers, so far there has been a
lack of formalization of what are the institutional requirements for the design of an optimal
equalization transfer. In this section, we present a simple reduced-form model of accountability
from which we derive three conditions for that optimal design: own-revenue, incentivecompatibility, and expenditure autonomy. The model is based on the concept of net fiscal benefits,
which is defined for each taxpayer as the difference between the benefits received from
government expenditures and the costs of financing those expenditures with taxes. Fiscal policies
that increase taxpayers’ welfare are rewarded with greater political support, and government
authorities maximize a function that depends on political benefits as well as the gains from
diverting public funds for their personal use. The model shows that intergovernmental transfers
reduce local government responsiveness and reveals the conditions that need to be met in order to
counter low responsiveness.
The preferences of the representative taxpayer are represented by a concave utility function
𝑢 that increases with the consumption of the private good 𝑥 and the local public good available in
the jurisdiction, 𝐺, which may plausibly be fully congestible. We do not model taxpayer’s behavior
fully. Instead, throughout the paper we will assume for simplicity that there is only one tax
instrument and that an increase in the tax rate 𝑡 triggers behavioral responses (in labor supply, tax
evasion and tax avoidance) of the representative taxpayer, reducing the size of the tax base 𝐵 =
𝐵(𝑡), such that 𝐵𝑡 < 0 , where the subscript represents a derivative.
Subnational governments can finance public goods with own tax revenue or with
exogenous intergovernmental transfers from the central government, 𝑇. Own revenue collection is
assumed to be associated with a cost function 𝐴, which summarizes all the monetary costs of
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administration, collection and enforcement.3 This cost function is assumed to be differentiable and
increasing in the amount of revenues collected, 𝑡𝐵(𝑡).4 Net own revenues are given by 𝑅(𝑡) =
𝑡𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴[𝑡𝐵(𝑡)].
In order to model the accountability mechanism we introduce the choice variable 𝜌 ∈ [0,1],
defined as subnational government responsiveness to the representative taxpayer’s preferences, or
the extent to which government decisions about public goods provision truthfully represent the
preferences of the constituents. If 𝜌 = 1, government expenditures perfectly represent the
preferences of the constituents. A value lower than unity implies that a share 1 − 𝜌 of subnational
government funds is “wasted”, due to the inaccurate representation of preferences, neglect,
production inefficiencies, corruption, or fraud. The amount of public goods and services
effectively provided by the subnational government is 𝐺(𝑡, 𝜌, 𝑇) = 𝜌(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇), while the amount
of resources diverted from which authorities can obtain personal benefits is (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇).
Fiscal policies of the subnational government provide net fiscal benefits to the
representative taxpayer, who in turn is assumed to provide political support to government
authorities in accordance to the net fiscal benefits received. Private consumption is 𝑋(𝑡) =
(1 − 𝑡)𝐵(𝑡) and the utility of the representative taxpayer is described by 𝑢(𝑋(𝑡), 𝜌(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇)) =
𝑣(𝑡, 𝜌, 𝑇), where 𝑣 is the indirect utility function. The individual marginal net benefits of an
increase of 𝑡 – which is also the marginal net fiscal incidence of the tax – is given by:
𝑣𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 𝑢𝑋 + 𝜌𝑅𝑡 𝑢𝐺 . (1.a)

3

The costs associated with the use of taxation could possibly include the political costs faced by government
authorities, as considered by Hettich and Winer (1984). In our analysis, however, political costs and benefits will be
defined separately in an explicit way.
4
We acknowledge that revenue collection technologies might be more complex. For instance, Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002) argue that tax administration cost functions may be discontinuous because slight changes in administrative
practices and policy decisions lead to discrete changes in administrative costs.

6

𝑣𝑡 can be greater, lower, or equal to zero, meaning that the individual taxpayer can gain, lose, or be
indifferent about an increase of 𝑡. Provided that 𝑋𝑡 < 0, when public goods are relatively scarce
we can expect 𝑢𝐺 to be high with respect to 𝑢𝑋 , and thus 𝑣𝑡 to be positive. Assuming diminishing
marginal utility, as 𝑡 increases, and public goods become more abundant, 𝑣𝑡 decreases and
eventually becomes negative. In contrast, a marginal increase of government responsiveness 𝜌 will
always increase net fiscal benefits, of course, bounded by its maximum value:
𝑣𝜌 = (𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇)𝑢𝐺 > 0 (1.b)
In this model political gains of government authorities are expected to move in the same
direction as taxpayers’ net fiscal benefits. For simplicity, we first assume that they have the same
value. Subnational authorities can gain political support by adjusting 𝑡 toward the level at which
𝑣𝑡 = 0 (where net fiscal benefits are maximized) or by increasing 𝜌. Note that subnational
authorities may altruistically value voters’ welfare and support, or may instead be selfishly
concerned about avoiding removal from office or increasing the probability of reelection, as the
means to maximize individual rents. Either motive has the same effect of protecting the interests of
voters. In practice, however, accountability can only be an issue when subnational authorities are
negligent or pursue their own agenda, which implies that subnational authorities cannot longer be
assumed to be purely benevolent and efficient.
Subnational authorities are assumed to choose 𝑡 and 𝜌 in order to maximize a concave
benefit function that comprises the political gains they obtain from the overall level of net fiscal
benefits, measured initially by the utility of the representative taxpayer, and the share of public
funds diverted for uses different from the efficient provision of public goods:5

Once we incorporate the proportion of waste of public funds 𝜌, we may also consider that a share of “active waste” 𝛿
will report direct benefits to the corrupted government officials (see Bandiera et al 2009 for the distinction between
active and passive waste and a theoretical and empirical analysis). In that case, the decision maker may use the term
(1 − 𝜌)𝛿𝑅 in the objective function, which would show the tradeoff between improving social welfare and increasing
5
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Ω = 𝑣(𝑡, 𝜌, 𝑇) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇).
The first order conditions are:
𝑡: 𝑣𝑡 = −(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡 , (2.a)
𝜌: 𝑣𝜌 = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇. (2.b)
Note that as long as 𝑅𝑡 > 0 , which is what we expect from a benefit-maximizer government, 𝑢𝑡
must be negative at the optimal 𝑡. Given diminishing marginal utility of private and public goods,
this means that the subnational government will generally choose a tax rate that is higher than the
level necessary to maximize taxpayers’ welfare and political gains.
We are particularly interested in the effect of exogenous transfers 𝑇 on optimal government
responsiveness. A negative (positive) effect of 𝑇 on 𝜌 implies that transfers worsen (improve)
accountability and responsiveness. First, we consider the case in which the representative taxpayer
fully accounts for all the effects of 𝑇 on her net fiscal benefits. Using comparative statics, the
effect is given by:6
𝑑𝜌
𝑑𝑇

=

(𝑣𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 )(1−𝜌𝑣𝜌𝜌 )+(𝑣𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡 )𝑣𝑡𝑇
(𝑣𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 )𝑣𝜌𝜌 −(𝑣𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡 )

2

.

Quasi-concavity requires the denominator (the determinant of the Hessian) to be positive, thus the
sign of the expression will be the same as the sign of the numerator. Since it is not clear what the
sign of 𝑣𝜌𝑡 and 𝑣𝑡𝑇 are, the effect of 𝑇 on 𝜌 is ambiguous. At this point we can conclude that when
political support is assumed to be equal to net fiscal benefits, it is not possible to predict a negative
effect of transfers on government responsiveness.

their own gains. This term would be relevant for describing a more general solution to the problem at hand, but would
not significantly change the implications of our model of accountability. Thus, for simplicity we will assume 𝛿 = 0
and restrict the scope of the model to a wide range of inefficiencies, which may or may not involve corruption.
6
Derivation in Appendix I.
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The argument put forward by applied economists, however, is that accountability is
imperfect and taxpayers care (or care much more) about the performance of government
authorities only when public expenditures are financed with their own money. More than an
assumption, imperfect accountability is also a logical requirement of the model, because local
authorities can take advantage of public office only if they are not subject to perfect oversight and
political control from their constituents. In order to incorporate this argument, we assume that 𝑇
cannot be fully observed by the taxpayers.7 Consistent with those assumptions, we represent
political support with the function 𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑡, 𝜌), which is assumed to accumulate the marginal net
fiscal benefits of 𝑡 and government responsiveness 𝜌, but it does not directly vary with 𝑇.
Therefore, by definition 𝜋𝑇 = 0, and changes in 𝑇 can affect political support only through their
influence on 𝑡 and 𝜌. The objective function for the subnational authorities and the first order
conditions are rewritten as
Ω′ = 𝜋(𝑡, 𝜌) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇),
𝑡: 𝜋𝑡 = −(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡 , (3.a)
𝜌: 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇. (3.b)
Using comparative statics, the effect of 𝑇 on 𝜌∗ is:8
𝑑𝜌
𝑑𝑇

=

𝜋𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡
(𝜋𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 )𝜋𝜌𝜌 −(𝜋𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡 )

2

. (4)

Under diminishing marginal utility and assuming 𝑅𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0, the numerator of the right hand side is
negative, which implies that intergovernmental transfers reduce government responsiveness.9 The

7

An alternative way to justify this assumption follows from observing that even if information about the amount of
transfers is made fully available to the taxpayers, that information is meaningless if they do not know the costs of
providing public goods and services.
8
Derivation is shown in Appendix II.
9
The assumption 𝑅𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 is standard in the literature, and can be considered a second order requirement for the
existence of an interior solution. To see this, note that, 𝑅𝑡𝑡 > 0 implies that the productivity of a tax instrument
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reason is that transfers give the authorities more “room to cheat,” so that they can reduce
responsiveness without reducing (or even increasing) their political gains. This result is consistent
with the predictions and empirical findings of Brollo et al (2013) and Gadenne (2017), who find
that transfers worsen accountability. The conclusion is that responsiveness improves with own tax
revenue, and that accountability is maximized when 𝑇 = 0.
An advantage of the reduced-form model just described is that it can be easily linked to the
standard maximization model used in the analysis of second-best government decisions. Using the
assumption that 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡 and 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑣𝜌 at the optimal solution, we can rely on (2.b) and (2.c) to
obtain the condition for the optimal amount of government expenditures:10
𝑢𝐺
𝑢𝑥

=

−𝑋𝑡
𝑅𝑡

(5)

which is the adjusted Samuelson condition for the optimal amount of public expenditures under a
second-best scenario where lump-sum taxation is unavailable. The right hand side corresponds to
the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), a measure of the welfare costs paid by society for a
marginal increase in government revenues.11 This result shows that the traditional adjusted
Samuelson condition, normally derived under the assumption of benevolent government, is also
meaningful in more realistic scenarios where the government is not benevolent.
However, it is important to note that condition (5) does not describe the welfare
maximizing solution when 𝜌 < 1. The right hand side of the condition underestimates the MCF of
the representative taxpayer because it considers as gains the rents received by subnational

increases with the tax rate. Other things equal, public goods and services become cheaper with higher tax rates and
there would be no reason to choose a tax rate lower than 100%.
10
Provided 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡 and 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑣𝜌 , we can use (2.a), (2.b), (3.a) and (3.b) to show that at the optimal response in (4),
𝑣𝜌 = −(𝑅(𝑡) + 𝑇)𝑣𝑡 /(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡 . Making the right hand side of this equation equal to the right hand side of (1.b), and
rearranging, 𝑣𝑡 = −(1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡 𝑢𝐺 . Substituting into (1.a) we can obtain (5).
11
Ballard and Fullerton (1992) and Dahlby (2008) provide extensive discussions of the concept of the marginal cost of
funds. Examples of formal definitions of the concept can be found also in Håkonsen (1998) and Auerbach and Hines
(2002).

10

authorities, which are not shared with the rest of society.12 Provided 𝜌 < 1, the tax rate that
maximizes the utility of the representative taxpayer can be described by 𝑣𝑡 = 0. Using (1.a), we
obtain
𝑢𝐺
𝑢𝑥

=

−𝑋𝑡
𝜌𝑅𝑡

(6)

which is the adjusted Samuelson condition after correcting for limited government responsiveness.
The right hand side is the “true” MCF faced by the representative taxpayer and, as expected, it
increases with the reduction of 𝜌.13
Figure 1 describes the effect of intergovernmental transfers on the optimal amount of
public goods. The horizontal axis represents public expenditures and the vertical axes the marginal
costs and benefits of public funds. The demand for government expenditures is given by the
representative taxpayer’s marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods, which is
assumed to be decreasing. The supply of public expenditures corresponds to the MCF, which is a
function of 𝑡, 𝜌, and 𝑇. In particular, the MCF function is assumed to be increasing in 𝑡. The initial
equilibrium 𝑒 1 corresponds to a situation without transfers, where government responsiveness 𝜌 is
at its maximum value, assumed here to be 1, and the optimal MCF faced by the jurisdiction is
𝑀𝐶𝐹1 . The effect of an exogenous amount of intergovernmental transfers 𝑇 is to shift the MCF
function from 𝑀𝐶𝐹′ to 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′ and to move the equilibrium to 𝑒 2 .14 Transfers allow the government
12

To see this, knowing that 𝜋𝜌 = 𝑣𝜌 we can use (1.b) and (2.b) to show that 𝑢𝐺 = 1. Replacing this value into (1.a)
and equating the right hand sides of (1.a) and (2.a) we obtain (𝑋𝑡 𝑢𝑋 + 𝜌∗ 𝑅𝑡 ) + (𝑅𝑡 − 𝜌∗ 𝑅𝑡 ) = 0. It is easy to see that
an increase in 𝜌∗ leads to additional political gains (the term 𝜌∗ 𝑅𝑡 in the first parenthesis) which are exactly offset by
the reduction in individual rents (the term −𝜌∗ 𝑅𝑡 in the second parenthesis).
13
The MCF faced by a local community considers only the welfare costs borne inside the jurisdiction. The welfare
costs borne by taxpayers outside the jurisdiction, due for instance to the negative effect that 𝑡 may have on the central
government tax collections, are normally disregarded by subnational authorities. We come back to this issue in section
4, where we analyze the problem of revenue decentralization in the presence of tax externalities.
14
More commonly, intergovernmental transfers are associated with positive, although relatively low or subsidized,
marginal costs to subnational governments. This is because a share of the transfers received may have been financed
with taxes collected inside the jurisdiction, and so they may either erode subnational tax bases or require some degree
of subnational tax effort. Revenue sharing on a derivation basis is an example of transfers fully financed with
internally-raised taxes.
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to substitute away own tax collections (reduced from 𝐺 1 to 𝑅 2 ), while increasing public goods
provision and reducing the optimal MCF from 𝑀𝐶𝐹1 to 𝑀𝐶𝐹 2 .15
The equilibrium 𝑒 2 describes the optimal choice of self-interested government authorities,
but not the amount of public goods available to the representative taxpayer. In accordance to (4)
and (6), transfers reduce government responsiveness and thus shift the representative taxpayer’s
MCF function to 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′′. The amount of public goods actually available to the representative
taxpayer is 𝐺 2 , found by evaluating 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′′ at the marginal cost 𝑀𝐶𝐹 2 . The welfare maximizing
solution described in (6) is found at 𝑒 3 , but that point is no longer feasible.
Figure 1
Effect of transfers on optimal government expenditures
Mg. benefits
and costs
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Thus, if provided in the right amount, intergovernmental transfers allow subnational
governments to reach more efficient and/or fairer levels of expenditures, but at the cost of
worsening government responsiveness. The thought experiment presented in Figure 1 can now be
used to highlight three “conditions” for the design of an optimal equalization transfer system. None
of these conditions have been adequately addressed in the previous theoretical literature.

15

A similar result is found in Smart (1998), although based in a different reasoning. He argues that equalization
transfers reduce the MCF because they help to avoid part of the distortionary effects of local tax increases. See Dahlby
(2008, p.247) for additional discussion.
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First, we have what we will call the own-revenue condition. Since transfers worsen
government responsiveness, they increase the MCF faced by the representative taxpayer at any
given level of public goods provision – as illustrated by the shift from 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′ to 𝑀𝐶𝐹′′′ in Figure
1. Moreover, even though intergovernmental transfers can usually be expected to reduce the MCF
and stimulate public goods provision – as illustrated in the change from 𝑒 1 to 𝑒 3 – the opposite
result is also possible if they induce a significant loss of government responsiveness. The negative
effects of intergovernmental transfers on government responsiveness and the effective MCF call
for a measured use of transfers and the promotion of own sources of revenue for the financing of
local governments.
Second, we have the incentive-compatibility condition. In the presence of limited
government responsiveness, the representative taxpayer’s welfare maximizing amount of public
goods 𝐺 3 is neither feasible nor desirable. In the model developed in this section, self-interested
government authorities will choose to collect an amount of 𝑅 2 in tax revenue, and to provide
public goods by 𝐺 2 . It is not immediately clear what amount of public goods provision should an
equalization transfer system try to reach. For instance, reaching an amount equal to 𝑅 2 + 𝑇 > 𝐺 3 ,
would require additional transfers and therefore lead to a larger lack of responsiveness.
Third, we have the expenditure autonomy condition. The question about the desired amount
of public goods and services cannot be clarified without creating a new problem related with the
level of autonomy that subnational authorities should enjoy in a decentralized system of
government. If some of the gains from fiscal decentralization are realized because local authorities
are better positioned to tailor fiscal decisions to taxpayers’ preferences (Oates 1972), then the final
equilibrium should be determined by local policies, not by exogenous transfers. In this sense, an
important limitation of intergovernmental transfers is that they are not necessarily an effective tool
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to enhance decision making autonomy in expenditure choices. As McLure (2000, p. 626) puts it,
subnational expenditure autonomy requires that subnational governments are “able to control the
level of revenue at the margin; that is, they must be able to set the level of taxes to correspond to
the desires of voters”.16 Following this argument the optimal MCF faced by the representative
taxpayer should be allowed to vary in each jurisdiction in accordance to the local demand for
public goods and services, while the amount of transfers should not be affected by the autonomous
decisions made in different jurisdictions.
3. Designing the welfare maximizing equalization transfer
We now turn to the problem of designing an equalization transfer program that maximizes
social welfare, in a context where subnational autonomy is desirable but subject to self-interested
(inefficient) decisions by local authorities. The design of the optimal level of equalization will
need to satisfy the three conditions identified in the previous section. In this section we focus on
the optimal amount of equalization transfers; the affordability of the transfer’s system is analyzed
in the next section.
The equalization transfer system is normally designed by an institutional body at a level
higher than subnational governments, which is here assumed to be the central government.
Formally, in order to arrive at the welfare maximizing transfer program we need to assume that the
central government is benevolent. This assumption is made exclusively with the purpose of finding
a sound policy design for the equalization transfer program; it is by no means to argue that the
central government is in fact benevolent or that it may not be subject to similar incentives as
subnational authorities.
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Emphasis in the original.
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In countries where subnational governments are responsible for providing local public
goods and services, the central government usually determines common standards for subnational
public expenditures and revenue effort, and delivers the amounts of transfers that allow all
subnational governments to meet those standards. This strategy results in the system of
equalization transfers, in which the ability to finance comparable or standard baskets of certain
public goods and services is equalized across all governments of the same level.
The model developed in this section considers a central government and 𝐽 subnational
jurisdictions of the same level. Each jurisdiction 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 is assumed to have one representative
taxpayer. The central government applies a tax rate 𝑡 𝑐 identically to all jurisdictions, and each
subnational government retains autonomy to define its own tax rate 𝑡𝑗 inside its borders. 17 For
simplicity, we do not consider the potential mobility of the population or factors of production, nor
any horizontal externality imposed by local tax and expenditure decisions.18
As pointed out above, in order to find the optimal level of equalization transfers the central
government needs to satisfy the three conditions identified in the previous section. The ownrevenue condition deals with the more general problem of revenue assignments. Subnational
governments must be given access to revenue sources from which they can effectively collect a
significant amount of own revenue, as well as the discretional power to adjust the tax rates, if not
the tax bases (Martinez-Vazquez, 2015; McLure, 2000).

The local tax base 𝐵 𝑗 may or may not be shared between the subnational and the central government. Either the
subnational tax rate or the central tax rate could be set equal to zero to represent a tax instrument that has been
assigned exclusively to the central or subnational government, respectively.
18
Mobility may affect the optimal central government decisions through its effects on tax bases, but it is treated as an
exogenous variable that does not alter the prevailing normative goals of welfare maximization and (partial or full)
equalization. Horizontal fiscal externalities may also be relevant, but their effects on optimal revenue structure at the
national and local levels are of a similar nature to those of vertical fiscal externalities considered in the next section.
17
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The incentive-compatibility condition suggests that the design of the equalization transfer
system should help encourage responsive and efficient government behavior, while providing
taxpayers with incentives to hold local authorities accountable. In order to encourage government
responsiveness, we argue that equalization transfers should be determined under the normative
assumption of full responsiveness, or 𝜌 = 1. This assumption implies that a jurisdiction cannot be
compensated for the irresponsive behavior of its authorities. This means that the representative
taxpayer in each jurisdiction bears the full cost of electing self-interested government authorities.19
If this were not the case, the rewards of lower responsiveness would lead to inefficient expenditure
policies and to a soft budget constraint problem.20 By assuming 𝜌 = 1, therefore, we make sure
that the equalization transfer system helps the accountability mechanisms to work locally. In order
to encourage government efficiency, and as is common in both the theoretical and applied
literatures, we define a standard level of tax effort. Standard tax effort is jointly defined by a
standard tax rate 𝑡 𝑠 and a standard administrative cost function 𝐴𝑠 , both common to all
jurisdictions. For the same 𝑡 𝑠 , administrative costs above the standard lead only to lower net
revenue, not to more transfers. Similarly, when administrative costs are below the standard, net
revenue may increase without affecting the amount of transfers to be received.
To address the expenditure autonomy condition we divide subnational public expenditures
𝐺 𝑗 into two different categories. One consists of standard public expenditures per capita 𝐺 𝑠 , which
are meant to be fully financed by a mix of equalization transfers 𝑇𝑗 and by own revenues collected

19

Reduced responsiveness affects the actual tax rates and thus may impose tax externalities on other government units.
We deal with vertical tax externalities in Section 4.
20
The literature on the soft budget constraint focuses on the problems created by the use of transfers to assist
governments under financial stress, which suggests that intergovernmental transfers can actually be influenced by the
behavior of subnational governments (see Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack 2003). Accordingly, a number of empirical
studies treat intergovernmental transfers as an endogenous variable (Knight 2002; Gordon 2004; Dahlberg et al 2008).
In our discussion, we disregard this source of endogeneity and focus only on the normative aspects of subnational
finances.
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under a standard level of tax effort. Standard public expenditures 𝐺 𝑠 can be interpreted as the cost
of providing a common (or perhaps a minimum) bundle of public goods and services to the
representative taxpayer of each jurisdiction. The specific public goods and services included in the
subnational standard are assumed exogenous, and may be considered as “necessary” for the
representative taxpayers.
The other category consists of non-standard, autonomous, and discretional public
expenditures 𝐺 𝑑𝑗 . Under this category, we might include the same public goods and services
considered in the standard package, but only to the extent that they deviate from that standard level
of provision, or other public goods that the subnational government discretionally chooses to
provide and that are not part of the national standard package. Positive amounts of discretional
public expenditures should be financed entirely with own revenue collections.21 The distinction
between standard and discretional expenditures is important to model central government
intervention in a system where subnational governments are granted some degree of fiscal
autonomy. In such a system subnational governments are allowed to offer different amounts and
types of public goods and services, and the central government cannot, and should not, account for
those differences when distributing equalization transfers.
Formally, with the objective of maximizing the sum of utilities of the representative
taxpayers, the problem of designing the optimal equalization transfer system can be based on the
following Lagrangian expression:

21

Note that to the extent that subnational governments enjoy budget decision autonomy, in certain cases they could
decide to provide “tax reductions” to the taxpayers, such that the discretional tax rate 𝑡 𝑗 can possibly have negative
values.
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ℒ𝑠 = ∑

𝐽

𝑢 𝑗 (𝑋𝑗 , 𝐺 𝑠 , 𝐺 𝑑𝑗 , 𝐺 𝑐 ) + 𝜇 𝑠𝑗 {−𝐺 𝑠 + 𝑡 𝑠 𝐵 𝑗 − 𝐴𝑠 [𝑡 𝑠 𝐵 𝑗 ] + 𝑇𝑗 }

𝑗=1

+ 𝜇 𝑐 {−𝐺 𝑐 − ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑇𝑗 + 𝑡 𝑐 𝐵 − 𝐴𝑐 [𝑡 𝑐 𝐵]} (7)
where 𝐵 = ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝐵 𝑗 , both 𝑋𝑗 and 𝐵 𝑗 are functions of 𝑡 = 𝑡 𝑒 + 𝑡𝑗 + 𝑡 𝑐 , and 𝜇 𝑠𝑗 and 𝜇 𝑐 are the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraints of standard subnational expenditures
and the central government. The first order condition for the optimal amount of equalization
transfers 𝑇𝑗∗ is given by
𝑇𝑗 : 𝜇 𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇 𝑐 = 0 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. (8.a)
The optimal vector of intergovernmental transfers must make the marginal cost of standard own
revenue collections in any jurisdiction 𝑗 equal to the marginal cost of own revenues at the central
level. In other words, at the optimal solution, the marginal cost of financing standard public
expenditures should be identical for all government units across the country. Using (8.a), the first
order conditions for the optimal national standard of subnational public goods 𝐺 𝑠∗ and the optimal
standard subnational tax rate 𝑡 𝑠∗ can be written as:
𝑗

𝐺 𝑠:

∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑢 𝑠
𝐺
𝐽
𝑗 𝑗

𝐽

𝑠

𝑡 :
𝑗

= 𝜇 𝑐 (8.b)

− ∑𝑗=1 𝑋𝑡 𝑢 𝑗
𝑋
𝑗

∑𝐽𝑗=1(𝐵𝑗 +𝑡 𝑠 𝐵𝑡 −𝐴𝑠𝑡𝑠 )+𝑡 𝑐 𝐵𝑡 −𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑠

= 𝜇 𝑐 (8.c)

𝑗

where we have used 𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 𝑠 . Following Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995), we can combine (8.b) and
(8.c) to express the social marginal cost of funds of standard revenue collections, 𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠 , as the
product of an efficiency and an equity component. Equating the left hand sides of (8.b) and (8.c),
𝑗

dividing by the average marginal utility of income 𝑢̅𝑋 = ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑢𝑋 𝑗 /𝐽, multiplying by
∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑋𝑡𝑗 / ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑋𝑡𝑗 and rearranging, we obtain
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𝑗

∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑢 𝑠𝑗 ⁄𝐽
𝐺
̅𝑋
𝑢

𝑗

𝐽

=

𝑗 𝑗

𝐽

− ∑𝑗=1 𝑋𝑡
𝑗

∑𝐽𝑗=1(𝐵𝑗 +𝑡 𝑠 𝐵𝑡 −𝐴𝑠𝑡𝑠 )+𝑡 𝑐 𝐵𝑡 −𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑠

∙

̅𝑋
−∑𝑗=1 𝑋𝑡 𝑢𝑋 ⁄𝑢
𝐽

𝑗

− ∑𝑗=1 𝑋𝑡

. (9)

The first expression in the right hand side is the marginal efficiency cost of funds, 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹 𝑠 , which
increases with the negative externality of 𝑡 𝑠 on central government revenue collections, 𝑡 𝑐 𝐵𝑡 −
𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑠 . The second expression is Feldstein’s (1972) “distributional characteristic” of standard own
𝑗

𝑗

revenue collections, 𝐷𝐶 𝑠 . When either 𝑋𝑡 or 𝑢𝑋 are the same in all jurisdictions, then 𝐷𝐶 𝑠 = 1 and
𝑡 𝑠 has no distributional effects. In contrast, if the tax rate has a smaller effect on consumption in
jurisdictions with greater marginal utility of income (likely those that are poorer), then 𝐷𝐶 𝑠 < 1,
which means that inequalities are reduced. This implies that the social costs of tax collections are
partially offset by the social benefits of redistribution. We can conclude that the greater the
redistributive effects of the equalization transfer system, the greater the standard tax rate 𝑡 𝑠∗ that
should be required from subnational governments.
Moreover, if for a moment we make the unrealistic assumptions that subnational authorities
are fully responsive welfare maximizers, that their expenditure decisions consider only standard
(not discretional) public expenditures, and that they address the tax externalities they impose on
the central government, then their problem can be represented by (7), and the first order conditions
for the choice of the standard tax rate in each jurisdiction, 𝑡 𝑠𝑗 , can be written as
𝑗

−𝑋𝑡

𝑗

𝜇 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑢𝑋

𝑗

𝑗
𝑗
𝐵𝑗 +𝑡 𝑠 𝐵𝑡 −𝐴𝑠𝑡𝑠 +𝑡 𝑐 𝐵𝑡 −𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑠

= 𝑢𝑋 𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. (10)

Using the definition of 𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠 in (9) as well as the equalization condition in (8.a), it must be true
that under the optimal solution
𝑗

𝑢̅𝑋 𝑆𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠 = 𝑢𝑋 𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. (11)
An analogous result in the related literature has shown that the distributionally-weighted
MCFs are equalized across all government units (Dahlby 2009), and that the ratio of the MCFs of
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the two subnational governments is inversely related to the ratio of their distributional weights
(Dahlby and Wilson 1994).22 Different from these results, however, condition (11) applies only to
the provision of standard public expenditures, and it is explicitly based on several ideal
assumptions that cannot realistically describe actual government behavior.
Still, condition (11) is useful because it provides a normative framework where we can
define the basic constructs of the fiscal gap approach to designing equalization grants. In the
remains of this section we introduce formal definitions of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity,
and use them to characterize the fiscal gap as a sufficient approach to the optimal assignment of
equalization transfers.
3.1 Expenditure needs and fiscal capacity
The concepts of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs are the two fundamental building
blocks of most equalization transfer programs designed around the world. These programs are
based on the fiscal gap formula, computed as the difference between estimate of expenditure needs
and estimate of fiscal capacity.
What is the theoretical rationale for expenditure needs and fiscal capacity? To answer this
question, we proceed to define the concepts of expenditure needs, fiscal capacity, and vertical and
horizontal fiscal imbalances. We use Figure 2 to illustrate the definitions for these concepts for any
given jurisdiction, so the symbol 𝑗 can be omitted to simplify notation. But first, some setting up.
The horizontal axis represents only those goods and services subject to equalization. With no
transfers, the equilibrium is 𝑒 1 , on the intersection between the marginal benefit function and
marginal cost function 𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠′ , which is defined in accordance to (10). Using asterisks to represent

22

In a utilitarian welfare function with representative taxpayers, different jurisdictions have the same social weight. In
𝜕𝑊 𝑗
𝑗
this context, the traditional concept of distributional weight, given by 𝑗 𝑢𝑋 , is simplified to 𝑢𝑋 .
𝜕𝑢
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the optimal solution, the optimal amount of transfers 𝑇 ∗ shifts the function 𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠′ to 𝑀𝐶𝐹 𝑠′′ ,
moving the equilibrium to 𝑒 ∗ . As a result, the MCF decreases to 𝜇 𝑠∗ ⁄𝑢𝑋 and the amount of
standard public expenditures increases to 𝑅 𝑠∗ + 𝑇 ∗ .
Now, fiscal capacity or own revenue potential, 𝐹𝐶, is defined as the amount of own revenues
that a (fully responsive) subnational government would be able to collect at the optimal MCF under
the optimal standard level of tax effort. Formally, the fiscal capacity of any jurisdiction is
𝐹𝐶 = 𝑅 𝑠∗ . (12)
This definition is largely compatible with the traditional measurement of fiscal capacity, according
to which fiscal capacity corresponds to the ability to raise own revenues from the assigned tax
bases given a standard level of tax effort.23 In practice, however, it is not clear how full
responsiveness translates into budgetary decisions, and it is not possible to estimate fiscal capacity
under the full responsiveness assumption.24 Because of this reason, applied economists rely on the
more pragmatic assumption – implicit in fiscal capacity methodologies – of “average” tax effort
and responsiveness.
Similarly, expenditure needs, 𝐸𝑁, is defined as the optimal amount of standard public
expenditures that the subnational government should provide at the optimal MCF. Formally, the
expenditure needs of any jurisdiction are defined as:
𝐸𝑁 = 𝑅 𝑠∗ + 𝑇 ∗ . (13)
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See, for example, Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007). This definition differs from the one provided in Dahlby
(2009), in which the tax base is divided by its tax elasticity in order to account for the negative effect of the sensitivity
of the tax base on fiscal capacity. We do not do that, however, because the sensitivity of the tax base is already
accounted for by the slope of the MCF function.
24
Methodologies to estimating fiscal capacity can be found, for instance, in U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (1986) and Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
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This definition is compatible with the traditional notion of expenditure needs, typically related to a
“comparable” or “standard” package of goods and services, which is made affordable by the
transfers received and the fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction.25
As indicated already above, the fiscal gap of any jurisdiction, denoted by 𝐹𝐺, can be
defined as
𝐹𝐺 = 𝐸𝑁 − 𝐹𝐶 .(14)
A positive fiscal gap means that the amount of revenues raised under a given level of tax effort are
not enough to cover the expenditure needs of the jurisdiction, and thus additional resources in the
form of equalization transfers are required in order to provide a standard bundle of public goods
and services. In contrast, a negative fiscal gap implies that the jurisdiction has a “surplus” and is
able to provide more or better public services without any financial assistance.

Figure 2
Fiscal capacity, expenditures needs and optimal equalization transfers
Mg. benefits
and costs
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A discussion about the concept, measurement methodologies, and use of expenditure needs estimates is provided,
for example, by Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
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3.2 Horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances
Given that expenditure needs and tax bases vary widely across jurisdictions, it is normal to
observe significant differences in the value of fiscal gaps among governments of the same level.
These differences are known as horizontal imbalances, and equalization transfers are typically
aimed to eliminating, or at least reducing, these imbalances. In practice, countries make use of
three possible equalization strategies. Some distribute equalization transfers in accordance to
relative expenditure needs only; others attempt to equalize only the differences in fiscal capacity,
and others consider both factors simultaneously and attempt to equalize fiscal gaps (Boex and
Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Dafflon, 2007). To the extent that one additional monetary unit of
expenditure needs has exactly the same impact on the public budget as the reduction of one
monetary unit of fiscal capacity, both factors are equally important and the equalization of fiscal
gaps can be regarded as the best approach to equalization. Indeed, the optimal transfer vector under
condition (11) can be seen as an equalization transfer program that equalizes fiscal gaps across all
jurisdictions of the same level.
The differences observed in the design and depth of the expenditure and revenue
decentralization assignments lead to different fiscal gaps across levels of government. These
differences are usually referred to as vertical fiscal imbalances, and any transfer – including
general tax sharing – from the government level with a negative fiscal gap (usually the central
government) to the government level with positive fiscal gap (usually subnational governments)
would help reduce the vertical imbalances. Given the standard public expenditures and tax effort,
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the size of the vertical imbalance 𝑉𝐼 between the central and subnational governments under the
optimal solution described in (11) is given by:26
𝑉𝐼 = ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝐹𝐺 𝑗 .(15)
Under the same assumptions, we can also define horizontal imbalances as the differences in
fiscal gaps across governments of the same level. By using our definition of fiscal gap, therefore,
we can clearly define the concepts of vertical and horizontal imbalances.27
If the subnational governments with negative fiscal gaps transfer all their surpluses to the
subnational governments with positive fiscal gaps, the size of the vertical imbalance would be
equal to the total amount of transfers required to fully close the horizontal imbalances only.28 More
commonly, however, governments with negative fiscal gaps do not contribute to the equalization
transfer fund and thus the amount of resources required to fully eliminate the horizontal
imbalances is greater than the vertical imbalance. As a consequence, neither the horizontal nor the
vertical fiscal imbalances will be closed optimally (Boadway and Tremblay, 2006).
There are a number of possible limitations to the ability of the system to close fiscal gaps.
Besides the impossibility of collecting contributions from (richer) jurisdictions with negative fiscal
gaps, countries use transfers to fulfill objectives different from equalization, like pro-poor
programs or infrastructure investments. The resources used for these purposes will help to close
the vertical imbalance, but not necessarily the horizontal imbalances. As the central government is
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There is no clear agreement in the literature about the right terminology to define these concepts. Boadway and
Tremblay (2006, 2010), for example, use the term ‘fiscal gap’ to refer to what we call here vertical imbalance, and in
turn they use the term ‘fiscal imbalance’ to refer to deviations from the optimal equilibrium.
27
Bird and Tarasov (2004) argue that the two concepts cannot be cleanly separated, and for that purpose, they suggest
considering the vertical imbalance closed at the point where the fiscal gap of the wealthiest jurisdiction is zero.
28
Such an arrangement is known as the “fraternal” (or Robin Hood) approach to equalization, and it is relatively
common among European countries.
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unable to reduce the marginal cost of funds nationwide to the optimal level, there will be a
downward adjustment to the standard of expenditure needs that can be guaranteed by the system.
In general, note that in order to implement an equalization transfer program that reduces
horizontal imbalances, it is not necessary to know the marginal cost of funds’ functions faced by
each subnational government. In practice, it is sufficient to define the national standards for the
provision of public goods and services and the national standard of tax effort for the collections of
revenues, and to disburse the equalization transfers in accordance with the estimated fiscal gaps.
This is the point where the formal theory of revenue assignments meets the practice of equalization
transfer implementation using a fiscal gap approach. Policy makers do not need to understand the
theoretical underpinnings of the fiscal gap model; instead, they can rely on estimations of
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the different subnational governments.
4. Ensuring affordability and addressing vertical tax externalities
The concepts of standard public expenditures and standard tax effort are relevant only for
the purpose of computing the optimal equalization transfer vector, and do not guarantee in any way
that the transfers arrived at are actually affordable within existing budgets. In this section we focus
on the problem of ensuring affordability of the equalization transfer system. From the perspective
of the central government, this problem is simultaneous, but different in nature, from the normative
problem of what amount of equalization transfers subnational governments should receive. We
assume that subnational governments know the amounts of equalization transfers that they will
receive when choosing their optimal tax rates, and do not take into account the possible effects of
their current fiscal decisions on future equalization transfers. These assumptions seem plausible if
we consider that the fiscal gap formula uses expenditure needs instead of actual expenditures, and
fiscal capacity instead of actual revenues; and that in practice it is difficult for subnational
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governments to affect either component of the formula.29 The central government is assumed to
take subnational responses into account when deciding about the tax rates that will ensure the
affordability of the system.
Once optimal equalization transfers have been determined, each jurisdiction should enjoy
some degree of freedom to select the amount of standard and discretional public goods and
services that best fit local preferences (the expenditure autonomy condition). The greater the
demand for public goods and services, the greater the need for tax revenue and thus the higher the
optimal MCF in the jurisdiction. In this context, the actual level of tax effort should be expected to
vary with the preferences and characteristics of each community, and there is nothing inherently
wrong with choosing to exert lower or higher tax efforts than the average jurisdiction.
Subnational autonomy also implies that the amount of funds available to the central
government, and thus the optimal choice of the central government tax rate 𝑡 𝑐 , is subject to the
actual fiscal decisions of subnational authorities. In order to model the behavior of self-interested
subnational authorities in the presence of standard and discretional public expenditures, we need to
adjust the objective function used in Section 2. We use 𝑅 𝑠 = 𝑡 𝑠 𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑠 [𝑡 𝑠 𝐵(𝑡)], define
discretional own revenue 𝑅 𝑑 = 𝑡𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴[(𝑡 𝑠 + 𝑡)𝐵(𝑡)] + 𝐴𝑠 [𝑡 𝑠 𝐵(𝑡)], and drop the superscript 𝑗
for clarity. In addition, considering that marginal political gains have been assumed to be equal to
marginal net fiscal benefits, we abuse notation slightly and represent political support with the

29

Still, the theoretical and applied literatures recognize that subnational government may consider in certain cases the
effect of their fiscal decisions on equalization transfers. For instance, Smart (1998) explains that when transfers are
based on the observed tax base, an increase in local taxes that erode the tax base (𝐵𝑡 < 0) would lead to a reduction of
tax revenue collected under standard tax effort and so an increase of equalization transfers. One simple way to
minimize the manipulation of standard tax revenue by subnational governments is to average the last 3 or 5 year
estimates of fiscal capacity in order to delay the effect of fiscal decisions on transfers. If transfers are assigned in
accordance to (14) and fiscal capacity is averaged over 𝑛 years, then a reduction of one dollar of fiscal capacity in the
current period will lead to an increase of equalization transfers of only 1⁄𝑛 dollar.
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utility function 𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑋(𝑡), 𝐺 𝑠 , 𝐺 𝑑 , 𝐺 𝑐 ). The problem faced by the self-interested subnational
authorities can be represented by the following Lagrangian expression:
ℒ 𝑗 = 𝑢(𝑋(𝑡), 𝐺 𝑠 , 𝐺 𝑑 , 𝐺 𝑐 ) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅 𝑠 + 𝑅 𝑑 + 𝑇 ∗ )
+𝛿 𝑠 {−𝐺 𝑠 + 𝜌(𝑅 𝑠 + 𝑇 ∗ )} + 𝛿 𝑑 {−𝐺 𝑑 + 𝜌𝑅 𝑑 } ,
where 𝛿 𝑠 and 𝛿 𝑑 are the Lagrangian multipliers of standard and discretional subnational
expenditures, respectively. The first order conditions for the optimal choices of the discretional tax
rate 𝑡 and government responsiveness 𝜌 are
𝑡: 𝑋𝑡 𝑢𝑋 + (1 − 𝜌)(𝑅𝑡𝑠 + 𝑅𝑡𝑑 ) + 𝜌(𝛿 𝑠 𝑅𝑡𝑠 + 𝛿 𝑑 𝑅𝑡𝑑 ) = 0 , (16.a)
𝜌: −(𝑅 𝑠 + 𝑅 𝑑 + 𝑇 ∗ ) + 𝛿 𝑠 (𝑅 𝑠 + 𝑇 ∗ ) + 𝛿 𝑑 𝑅 𝑑 = 0 , (16.b)
which are analogous to (3.a) and (3.b).30
Defining 𝑅 𝑐 = 𝑡 𝑐 𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐴𝑐 [𝑡 𝑐 𝐵(𝑡)], the problem of the central government, which needs
to ensure affordability of public expenditures nationally while allowing for subnational discretion
is represented by the following Lagrangian expression:
ℒ𝑐 = ∑

𝐽

𝑢 𝑗 (𝑋𝑗 , 𝐺 𝑠 , 𝐺 𝑑𝑗 , 𝐺 𝑐 )

𝑗=1
𝐽

+∑

𝛿 𝑠𝑗 {−𝐺 𝑠𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 (𝑅 𝑠𝑗 + 𝑇𝑗∗ )} + 𝛿 𝑑𝑗 {−𝐺 𝑑𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 𝑅 𝑑𝑗 }

𝑗=1

+𝛿 𝑐 {−𝐺 𝑐 − ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑇𝑗∗ + 𝑅 𝑐 } . (17)
Assuming for simplicity that the utility functions are separable in 𝐺 𝑐 , such that its value does not
affect subnational decisions, the first order condition for its optimal choice is
𝐺𝑐:

∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑢𝐺𝑗 𝑐 = 𝜇 𝑐 . (18.a)

When we make no distinction between standard and discretional expenditures we can define 𝛿 = 𝛿 𝑠 = 𝛿 𝑑 , and
from (16.b) we obtain 𝛿 = 𝑢𝐺 = 1. Using this result, as well as 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡𝑠 + 𝑅𝑡𝑑 , condition (16.a) reduces to 𝑋𝑡 𝑢𝑋 +
𝑅𝑡 = 0. This last result can be rearranged to obtain the adjusted Samuelson condition in (5).
30
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Considering the effect of 𝑡 𝑐 on the subnational decisions of 𝑡𝑗 and 𝜌𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, which are
𝑗∗

𝑗∗

represented by 𝑡𝑐 and 𝜌𝑐 , and using (16.a) and (16.b), the first order condition for the optimal 𝑡 𝑐
can be simplified to
𝑗 𝑗
𝑠𝑗
𝑑𝑗
𝑡 𝑐 : ∑𝐽𝑗=1{𝑋𝑡 𝑢𝑋 𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 (𝛿 𝑠𝑗 𝑅𝑡 𝑐 + 𝛿 𝑑𝑗 𝑅𝑡 𝑐 )} (18.b.i)
𝑗∗

+𝛿 𝑐 (𝑅𝑡𝑐𝑐 + ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑡𝑡 𝑐 𝑅𝑡𝑐𝑗 ) (18.b.ii)
𝑗∗

𝑠𝑗

𝑑𝑗

− ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑡𝑡 𝑐 (1 − 𝜌𝑗 )(𝑅𝑡 𝑗 + 𝑅𝑡 𝑗 ) (18.b.iii)
𝑗∗

+ ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝜌𝑡 𝑐 (𝑅 𝑠𝑗 + 𝑅 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑇𝑗∗ ) = 0. (18.b.iv)
The central government must increase 𝑡 𝑐 up to the point where the marginal costs and marginal
benefits cancel each other. Among the costs, (18.b.i) represents the reduction in private
consumption and the provision of subnational public goods and services. Among the benefits,
(18.b.ii) represents tax collections after accounting for subnational tax responses. Whether
(18.b.iii) and (18.b.iv) correspond to costs or benefits of the central government tax policy will
𝑗∗

𝑗∗

depend on the sign of 𝑡𝑡 𝑐 and 𝜌𝑡 𝑐 . They would correspond to additional costs if 𝑡 𝑐 has a positive
effect on 𝑡𝑗∗ and a negative effect on 𝜌𝑗∗ .
By endogenizing the response of subnational tax policy and responsiveness in its optimal
tax decision, the central government can partially correct for inefficient subnational tax decisions.
These inefficiencies arise because subnational governments typically ignore the negative
externalities their decisions impose outside their jurisdictions. In particular, higher subnational tax
rates can erode the tax bases within the jurisdiction and thus impose a negative vertical externality
on the central government by reducing its tax revenues (Boadway and Keen 1996; Dahlby 1996;
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Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault 1998; Keen 1998; Dahlby and Wilson 2003).31 In order to
identify these externalities in our model, we note that if the choice of the subnational tax rate 𝑡𝑗
were to account for all the social benefits and costs described in (17), its first order condition
would be
𝑗 𝑗

𝑠𝑗

𝑑𝑗

𝑡𝑗 : 𝑋𝑡 𝑢𝑋 𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 (𝛿 𝑠𝑗 𝑅𝑡 𝑗 + 𝛿 𝑑𝑗 𝑅𝑡 𝑗 ) + 𝛿 𝑐 𝑅𝑡𝑐𝑗 = 0 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽.
The term 𝛿 𝑐 𝑅𝑡𝑐𝑗 corresponds to the value of revenue lost by the central government due to a
marginal increase of the subnational tax rate. A subnational government guided by the adjusted
Samuelson condition in (5) ignores this cost, but the presence of this term in (18.b.ii) suggests that
the central government can partially correct for it when deciding about the optimal amount of tax
collections. This finding contrasts with the idea that the negative tax externalities associated with
decentralized tax revenues should be fully corrected by the equalization transfer program in order
to avoid inefficiencies and welfare losses.32 This correction might be justified. However, it should
be so only on a differential basis because the externalities imposed by discretional tax decisions
would likely differ across jurisdictions. This differential correction can be understood as an
adjustment to the marginal cost of funds faced by each jurisdiction, and it would lead to an
adjustment to the optimal equalization vector implicitly described by (11).

31

Revenue externalities (positive or negative) can also be imposed on governments of the same level, but we have
ruled out this possibility for simplifying purposes. In any case, the effects and implications of horizontal externalities
are similar to those of vertical externalities. See, for instance, Gordon (1983) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006).
32
Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and Kotsogiannis (2010) describe the modifications required by a standard
equalization transfer formula in order to achieve efficient subnational taxation in the presence of horizontal and
vertical tax externalities, respectively.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the fiscal gap model used by applied economists around
the world in the design of equalization grants is compatible with a ‘holistic’ approach that
integrates practical as well as normative considerations. The fiscal gap model is largely compatible
with some of the findings of the (less holistic) previous theoretical literature on the design of
equalization transfers based on optimal tax theory, but the latter is shown to disregard some key
issues that are relevant for the implementation of an optimal equalization transfer program. These
issues include the need to account for discretional subnational decisions, the negative effects of
transfers on responsiveness, and the consequent need to introduce accountability mechanisms.
The framework presented in this paper is divided in three stages. The first stage deals with
the problem of limited government responsiveness and the need for accountability mechanisms. In
this regard we examine two questions: Is the devolution of sufficient own revenue sources a
precondition for a well-functioning equalization transfer program, and must the equalization
transfer program must be incentive-compatible by rewarding efficiency and government
responsiveness? The second stage focuses on the design of an optimal equalization transfer
program. In line with commonly accepted international practices, we assume that the goal of the
equalization transfer program is to ensure that all subnational governments are able to provide a
standard level of public goods and services at a standard level of tax effort, while promoting
efficient fiscal decisions. In order to obtain the optimal amount of equalization transfers that fulfill
this goal, we distinguish standard subnational expenditures subject to equalization from
discretional subnational expenditures that should be financed solely with own revenue sources.
Under this framework we provide formal, yet simple, definitions for expenditure needs, fiscal
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capacity, fiscal gap and fiscal imbalances. The third stage focuses on the central government
decision about the level of its tax rate, which ensures the affordability of the system.
The most important contribution in this paper is to show that the fiscal gap model is
sufficient to implement an optimal equalization transfer program and that the implementation of
this type of program requires only the estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.
Therefore, central government authorities and politicians do not need to try to find out what is the
marginal cost of public funds across jurisdictions.
For future research, there are several aspects of the framework introduced here that could
be extended, including the use of single representative-taxpayer jurisdictions, the absence of
mobility and other horizontal externalities, or the ability to take into account positive fiscal
externalities from expenditure policies.
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Appendix I.
The linearization of the system of first order conditions (2.a) and (2.b) can be written, in matrix form,
as
𝑢𝑡𝑇
𝑢𝜌𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑑𝑡 ∗
] ∗ [ ∗ ] = − [𝜌𝑢 − 1] ∗ [𝑑𝑇] (A.I.1)
𝑑𝜌
𝑢𝜌𝜌
𝜌𝜌

𝑢𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡
[
𝑢𝜌𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡

where the first matrix is the Hessian 𝐻. Using Cramer’s rule, the effect of transfers 𝑇 on optimal
government responsiveness 𝜌∗ is given by
𝑑𝜌∗
𝑑𝑇

𝑢 +(1−𝜌)𝑅
−𝑢𝑡𝑇
| 𝑡𝑡 𝑢 −𝑅 𝑡𝑡 1−𝜌𝑢
|
𝜌𝑡
𝑡
𝜌𝜌
𝑢𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡
|
|
𝑢𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡
𝑢𝜌𝜌

=

=

(𝑢𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 )(1−𝜌𝑢𝜌𝜌 )+(𝑢𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡 )𝑢𝑡𝑇
(𝑢𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 )𝑢𝜌𝜌 −(𝑢𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡 )

2

, (A.I.2)

which is equal to the result in the text.

Appendix II. Derivation of (4)
Since 𝑇 does not directly affect taxpayer’s political support 𝜋(𝑡, 𝜌), the system in (A.I.1) becomes
𝜋𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡
[
𝜋𝜌𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡

𝜋𝜌𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑑𝑡 ∗
0
] ∗ [ ∗ ] = [ ] ∗ [𝑑𝑇] (A.II.1)
𝑑𝜌
𝜋𝜌𝜌
1

Using Cramer’s rule, the effect of 𝑇 on 𝜌∗ is given by
𝑑𝜌∗
𝑑𝑇

=

𝜋 +(1−𝜌)𝑅
| 𝑡𝑡 𝜋 −𝑅 𝑡𝑡
𝜌𝑡

𝑡

𝜋𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡
|
𝜋𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡

0
1|
𝜋𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡
|
𝜋𝜌𝜌

=

𝜋𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡
(𝜋𝑡𝑡 +(1−𝜌)𝑅𝑡𝑡 )𝜋𝜌𝜌 −(𝜋𝜌𝑡 −𝑅𝑡 )

2

, (A.II.2)

which is equal to (4).
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